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In recognition of insiders’ legitimate need to transact in their 
company’s stock from time to time, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-1 in 
2000.  Under the rule, an insider may point to participation in a plan 
whereby stock purchase prices, dates, and volumes are determined in 
advance to rebut a charge of insider trading.  In the years since the creation 
of these 10b5-1 plans, however, it has become clear that insiders may be 
exploiting loopholes in the system to engage in increased levels of insider 
trading.  This Article details the development of 10b5-1 plans, explains the 
ambiguities leading to abuse of the plans, and recommends proposals for 
change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 2000, the state of the law regarding the scienter requirement 
for insider trading was unsettled.  With the promulgation of Rule 10b5-1, 
however, the SEC clarified that knowing possession of material, nonpublic 
information accompanied by a trade satisfied the scienter component of a 
Rule 10b-5 violation.1  In its Adopting Release for Rule 10b5-1, the SEC 
also provided for an affirmative defense whereby insiders could enter into a 
transaction agreement with a broker prior to coming into possession of 
material, nonpublic information.2  The 10b5-1 plan was intended to rebut 
an allegation of insider trading if trades were executed within the plan and 
in compliance with several factors outlined by the SEC.3  In creating the 
affirmative defense, the SEC acknowledged that insiders are often in 
possession of material, nonpublic information but often have a need to 
transact in their companies’ securities for legitimate reasons, including 
liquidity and diversification.4 
Over a decade after the birth of Rule 10b5-1 and the affirmative 
defense, it is increasingly apparent that 10b5-1 plans are doing little to 
avert insider trading.  In fact, both academic research and a number of 
high-profile cases support the proposition that executives commonly are 
manipulating the plans to provide cover for illegal trading activity.5  A 
 
 1.  See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000). 
 2.  Id. at 51,726-29. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See, e.g., Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., SEC Div. of Enforcement, Speech by 
SEC Staff:  Opening Remarks Before the 15th Annual NASPP Conference (Oct. 10, 2007), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch101007lct.htm#9 (“The idea was to give 
executives opportunities to diversify or become more liquid through the use of plans with 
prearranged trades without facing the prospect of an insider trading investigation.”). 
 5.  See, e.g., part III, infra pp. 955-962 (discussing ways in which the plans have been 
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watershed moment in the history of 10b5-1 plans occurred in November 
2012, when the Wall Street Journal published an exposé highlighting a 
number of instances in which executives fortuitously avoided significant 
losses by selling company stock in advance of negative news events.6  In 
each case, transactions occurred ostensibly within the bounds of a 10b5-1 
plan.  In response, the SEC appears to be interested in amending the Rule 
and institutional investors have begun calling for changes.  While the 
ultimate form the plans will take is uncertain, it is clear that modification is 
necessary for the plans to fulfill their intended purpose. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Prior to exploring (1) the requirements of the 10b5-1 affirmative 
defense, (2) the loopholes that executives are abusing, and (3) proposed 
changes to the plans, it is necessary to discuss the background of Rule 10b-
5 and the common law development of the scienter requirement for insider 
trading. 
A. The Common Law Split On Insider Trading 
Prior to the enactment of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
(“‘34 Act”) and the promulgation of Rule 10b-5, two distinct schools of 
thought regarding classical insider trading developed.7  Both viewpoints 
 
manipulated). 
 6.  Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Dark Markets:  Executives’ Good Luck in Trading 
Own Stock, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2012, at A1 [hereinafter Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ 
Good Luck]. 
 7.  The following discussion regarding the two distinct schools of thought is in 
reference to classically conceived insider trading, where a corporate director or officer 
engages in trades involving his or her own company’s stock.  Classically conceived insider 
trading has been described as “liability [that] occurs when a person, who stands in a 
fiduciary relationship with a market participant trades shares with this participant while in 
possession of material, non-public information.”  Marcy G. Dworkin, The Misappropriation 
Theory As A Corollary to the Classic Insider Trading Theory, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 315, 
318 (1996) (internal footnotes omitted). 
  That description, as we will see, was up for debate under common law standards.  
Classically conceived insider trading stands in contrast to the misappropriation theory of 
insider trading, which commonly involves a party who is not a corporate officer or director, 
but is someone who comes into possession of material nonpublic information and uses it to 
his or her advantage.  Under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, a fiduciary duty 
does not exist between the insider and the party who trades.  Misappropriation Theory of 
Insider Trading, 111 HARV. L. REV. 410, 410 (1997).  Rather, it focuses on the duty owed 
by the insider to the source of the misappropriated information. Id.  The misappropriation 
theory of insider trading was first endorsed by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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turned on whether a fiduciary duty extends from corporate insiders to 
stockholders in their individual capacity.8  If it does, then insiders had a 
duty to disclose material facts prior to engaging in trades with that 
individual; if not, then no such obligation existed.  Under the affirmative 
view, the proposition flowed naturally from the principle that directors 
were obligated to pursue profit through the corporation.9  Given the 
inseparability of corporate profit and stock price, director fiduciary duties 
must attach to both.10  Under the negative view, buying and selling of 
corporate stock involved stockholders in their individual capacity (separate 
and apart from the corporate form), and directors owed no special duties in 
this regard.11 
Although scholars have described the pro-finding of fiduciary duty 
between corporate insiders and individual stockholders as the minority 
view,12 it nonetheless appeared to have garnered the support of significant 
numbers of courts.13  The Supreme Court of Georgia aptly articulated the 
position in the 1903 case of Oliver v. Oliver,14 when it argued that: 
[T]he fact that [a director] is trustee for all is not to be perverted 
into holding that he is under no obligation to each [stockholder].  
The fact that he must serve the company does not warrant him in 
becoming the active and successful opponent of an individual 
stockholder with reference to the latter’s undivided interest in the 
very property committed to the director’s care.15 
According to the court, neglecting to find a fiduciary relationship extending 
 
 8.  See Clarence D. Laylin, The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock, 27 
YALE L.J. 731, 739 (1918) (“The assumption seems correct that some such fiduciary relation 
must be established . . . .  Without it, there would be no more foundation for the duty to 
disclose unsolicited information to a stockholder than there would be for such a duty on the 
part of a director selling his own shares to an outsider.”). 
 9.  Id. at 738. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 734. 
 12.  Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading:  The Historical 
Antecedents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1302 (1998). 
 13.  See e.g., Beck v. Fishel, 36 Ohio C.C. 616, 622 (Ohio Ct. App. June 7, 1909) 
(“Ordinarily the officer of a corporation is bound to account to his stockholders for the 
avails of any sale made by him, as any other trustee is bound to account to his beneficiary 
for the avails of sales made by him”); Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277, 279-80 (Kan. 1904) 
(“Since the stockholders own these shares, and since the value thereof . . . are affected by 
the conduct of the directors, a trust relation plainly exists between the stockholders and the 
directors . . . .  From it arise the fiduciary duties of the directors towards the stockholders”); 
McManus v. Durant, 168 A.D. 643, 663-64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915) (“This devolution of 
unlimited power imposes on a single holder of the majority of the stock a correlative duty, 
the duty of a fiduciary or agent, to the holders of the minority of the stock . . . .”). 
 14.  45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903). 
 15.  Id. at 233. 
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to individual stockholders that would proscribe insider trading was 
downright paradoxical: It would “inevitably lead[ ] to the conclusion that, 
while a director is bound to serve stockholders en masse, he may 
antagonize them one by one; that he is an officer of the company, but may 
be the foe of each private in the ranks.”16 
In contrast with Oliver, the so-called majority view of insider trading 
under common law did not think corporate insiders owed a duty to 
individual stockholders to disclose material information about the company 
prior to engaging in trades with them.  Indeed, as one scholar described it 
in a 1919 article, if an individual seller knows that the buyer, by virtue of 
his position, may know more about the value than the seller, then “there is 
nothing morally or legally wrong, according to present-day standards, in 
laying upon [the seller] the burden of making inquiry of the buyer, and in 
declaring that he assumes the risk involved in [the buyer’s] own silence.”17 
One of the earliest cases to hold that corporate fiduciary duties do not 
extend to situations involving insider trading is Carpenter v. Danforth.18  In 
Carpenter, defendant Danforth, a director of The National Bank Note 
Company, purchased 136 shares of his corporation’s stock from plaintiff 
for $60 per share, or $10 per share above par.19  Danforth’s motive, both for 
purchasing the stock and for paying a premium, appears to have been 
gaining control of the corporation at a point when it was poised to take 
advantage of lucrative government contracts.20  The work did indeed come 
through as hoped, and Danforth profited handsomely by receiving the 
corporation’s first-ever dividend21 of 310 percent within five months of his 
stock purchase, as well as another 200 percent dividend eight months 
thereafter.22 
In spite of the air of bad faith surrounding the transaction, which was 
further supported by the fact that Danforth purchased the stock from the 
 
 16.  Id. at 235. 
 17.  Laylin, supra note 8, at 739-40. 
 18.  52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868). 
 19.  Id. at 582. 
 20.  Id. at 588.  The lucrative contracts, described as “work done for the government on 
the postage currency,” id., were possibly related to the ongoing monetary crisis arising from 
the Civil War.  The U.S. Government, facing difficulties in paying for the war, issued new 
bonds, notes, and currency, financial instruments that revolutionized the U.S. monetary 
system.  Dancing the “Legal Tender Polka”:  Public Reaction to Changes in Government 
Securities during the Civil War, BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, available at http://www.moneyfactory.gov/wdclincolnexhibit3.html.  The 
issuance of these new securities preceded the signing of the Legal Tender Act by President 
Abraham Lincoln on February 25, 1862, and the signing of the Fractional Currency Act later 
that year. Id. 
 21.  Carpenter, 52 Barb. at 590. 
 22.  Dawson v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of United States, 157 N.W. 929, 933 (Iowa 1916). 
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executor of a family friend’s estate “under the guise of friendship,”23 the 
court stated that any duties Danforth owed to plaintiff did not extend to the 
stock itself.24  The court noted that although there was a trust relationship 
between Danforth and the plaintiff, the relationship “extended only to the 
management of the general affairs of the corporation, with a view to 
dividends of profits; and . . . [it] extended no farther.”25  Therefore, the 
court held, Danforth owed the plaintiff nothing more than the duty not to 
engage in actual fraud.26  In the absence of fraudulent misrepresentation or 
concealment of a material fact, Danforth was not liable to the plaintiff.27 
Many courts continued to hew to the majority view regarding insider 
trading for at least the next fifty years.28  In the 1933 case of Goodwin v. 
Agassiz,29 plaintiffs sold several hundred shares of Cliff Mining Company 
on the Boston Stock Exchange after reading in a newspaper that the 
company was ceasing exploratory operations for copper land it owned in 
Northern Michigan.30  Defendants, who served as executives of the 
company, believed, based on a geologist’s theory (unbeknownst to 
plaintiffs), that valuable copper deposits did exist in the area—failed 
exploratory operations notwithstanding.  Defendants consequently 
purchased plaintiff’s stock in a blind transaction and, after the geologist’s 
theory came to light, plaintiffs sued.31  The Massachusetts Supreme Court, 
in affirming the trial court’s decision, held that while the executives did 
owe fiduciary duties to stockholders, they had no duty regarding disclosure 
when buying and selling in an impersonal market.32 
Though the majority view might seem to have produced some 
unpalatable results, courts mitigated its harshness in two ways:  liability 
still attached to insiders who engaged in fraud, and the courts sometimes 
recognized the existence of a duty to disclose if the insider was in 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Carpenter, 52 Barb. at 584. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 586-87. 
 27.  Id. at 587. 
 28.  See, e.g., The Board of Comm’rs of Tippecanoe Co. v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 524 
(1873) (railroad company president not required to disclose that the stock he was purchasing 
from a stockholder was significantly undervalued where his acts were found not to relate to 
the “property or to the business of the corporation”); Crowell v. Jackson, 23 A. 426, 427 
(N.J. 1891) (stating that “[a] director or the treasurer of a corporation is not, because of his 
office, in duty bound to disclose to an individual stockholder, before purchasing his stock, 
that which he may know as to the real condition of the corporation affecting the value of 
that stock.”). 
 29.  186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933). 
 30.  Id. at 659-60. 
 31.  Id. at 660. 
 32.  Id. at 661.  
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possession of “special facts.”  In the context of securities trading, common 
law fraud includes: (1) “misrepresentation made for the purpose of 
inducing reliance upon [a] false statement,”33 as well as (2) fraudulent 
concealment of a material fact.34  Thus, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
found in Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.35 that defendants were liable 
for devising a fraudulent plan between a bank and a company president to 
engage in a leveraged buy-out without disclosing material facts to the 
selling shareholder.36 
There was also an exception to the common law rule in the case of 
“special facts.”  The Supreme Court recognized the special facts doctrine in 
Strong v. Repide.37  In Strong, the plaintiff’s broker had sold eight hundred 
shares of the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company to a broker 
acting on behalf of defendant.38  Plaintiff’s agent was unaware of 
defendant’s identity (and indeed, defendant’s broker was likewise unaware, 
because he had been employed by an acquaintance of the defendant and not 
by the defendant directly).39  The defendant, who owned three-fourths of 
the company’s stock and who served as director, also knew the value of the 
shares would multiply shortly thereafter, on account of an impending sale 
of the company’s land to the U.S. Government for an attractive premium.40  
The Supreme Court, in finding the defendant liable, held that a director in 
possession of “special facts” regarding the value of the stock was under a 
duty to disclose those facts to the shareholder prior to trading the stock.41  
Liability attached to the defendant, therefore, not “simply [because of] his 
character as a director, but because, in consideration of all the existing 
circumstances . . . it became the duty of the defendant, acting in good faith, 
to state the facts before making the purchase.”42 
B. Rule 10b-5 is Promulgated to Unify Securities Trading Laws 
As the forgoing discussion illustrates, the state of the law regarding 
liability for classical insider trading prior to the Great Depression was 
 
 33.  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980); see also Carpenter v. 
Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868) (defining fraud as a misrepresentation of a 
material fact between a buyer and a seller). 
 34.  Carpenter, 52 Barb. at 587. 
 35.  134 A.2d 761 (N.J. 1957). 
 36.  Id. at 772. 
 37.  213 U.S. 419 (1909). 
 38.  Id. at 425. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 424-25. 
 41.  Id. at 431. 
 42.  Id. 
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incongruous at best.  It seems unsurprising, therefore, that a number of 
“flagrant abuse[s] of inside information” were discovered in hearings 
preceding the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 (“‘33 Act”) and the 
’34 Act.43  In an attempt to more uniformly regulate securities markets in 
general, Congress, therefore, enacted the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts.44  In passing the 
‘34 Act, Congress did not attempt to enumerate an exhaustive list of acts 
that would amount to securities law violations; rather, it sought to draft a 
“catch-all” provision “intended to cover the full range of fraudulent 
conduct that human ingenuity might devise.”45 
Specifically, Section 10(b) provides that it is: 
[U]nlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, 
or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To 
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance . . . .”46 
To implement Section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which 
makes it unlawful to (a) defraud third parties, (b) make false statements of 
material fact or fail to provide material information in order to correct 
misleading statements, or (c) engage in any course of action that is, or 
would constitute, fraud or deceit respecting the purchase or sale of any 
security.47 
Courts have construed insider trading to be an instance of fraudulent 
conduct that falls within the broad ambit of Rule 10b-5.48  Though “insider 
 
 43.  Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 44.  Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:  The Continued 
Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 843, 851 (2009). 
 45.  United States v. Lang, 766 F. Supp. 389, 400 (D. Md. 1991) (internal citation 
omitted); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (noting that 
Section 10(b) “was described rightly as a ‘catchall’ clause to enable the Commission ‘to 
deal with new manipulative (or cunning) devices’”) (internal citation omitted).  But see 
Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 385, 430 (1990) (explaining that the ‘34 Act as a whole was passed for the 
protection of investors, while Section 10(b) specifically sought to make certain activities 
illegal that had been closely associated with speculative trading). 
 46.  15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
 47.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2012). 
 48.  Note, however, that rule 10b-5 is not the only securities law that prohibits insider 
trading.  Section 16(b) of the ‘34 Act requires an insider to disgorge gains from a purchase 
followed by sale (or the reverse, a sale followed by purchase) within a six-month period, 
inferring insider trading from the mere existence of such paired transactions.  Merritt B. 
Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives:  A Unified Theory of 
Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2089-90, 2126 (1994).  Additionally, Rule 14a-9 is 
designed to prohibit insider abuse with regard to proxy materials, Rule 13e-3(b) regulates 
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trading” is not specifically defined in federal securities laws, it is widely 
understood to mean securities trading based on, or while in possession of, 
material, nonpublic information.49  In re Cady, Roberts & Co. was one of 
the first cases to take this position when it imposed liability on a broker 
who sold a corporation’s stock on behalf of clients upon receiving advance 
word that the corporation was cutting its quarterly dividend.50  The broker, 
Gintel, had learned of the dividend cut after one of his fellow employees, 
who also happened to be on the board of the corporation cutting the 
dividend, telephoned Gintel with the news promptly upon the board’s 
decision, nearly an hour before it went public.51 
The rationale for imposing liability in these situations is that to allow 
an insider to take advantage of material nonpublic information is to allow 
fraud upon the public.  In other words, insider trading is but one of the 
“infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of 
investors and others.”52  SEC Commissioner William Cary noted in Cady, 
Roberts that the insider may avoid committing this particular variety of 
fraud by disclosing the pertinent information prior to trading or, if releasing 
the information first were not practicable, by abstaining from the 
transaction altogether.53 
Cady, Roberts did not attempt to define the term “insider.”  However, 
it did note that the class extended beyond just executives of the company.  
After remarking that the duty not to engage in insider trading traditionally 
applied to “officers, directors and controlling stockholders,” Commissioner 
Cary explained that the list was not exhaustive, but that the class could best 
be demarcated by looking at: (1) the existence of a relationship giving an 
individual access to material, nonpublic information by virtue of his 
 
insider trading in going-private transactions, and Regulation M-A, Item 1011(b) controls in 
mergers and acquisitions. Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of 
“Material” in Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 170 (2011).  Section 17(a) of the ‘33 
Act and 15(c)(1) of the ‘34 Act also provide avenues of policing insider trading.  Freeman, 
584 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1978).  Finally, the Second Circuit has held that the SEC had the 
authority to pursue a party for insider trading liability under Rule 14e-3 in the tender offer 
context, despite the lack of a fiduciary duty as classically conceived in Chiarella.  William 
J. Cook, From Insider Trading to Unfair Trading:  Chestman II and Rule 14e-3, 22 
STETSON L. REV. 171, 174 (1992). 
 49.  David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappropriation Theory 
of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41, 41-42 (1998). 
 50.  In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 
(Nov. 8, 1961). 
 51.  Id. at 909. 
 52.  Id. at 911. 
 53.  See id. (“[F]ailure to make disclosure [when in possession of material, nonpublic 
information] constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions.  If, on the other hand, 
disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the 
circumstances, we believe the alternative is to forego the transaction.”). 
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position; and (2) the “inherent unfairness” problems implicated in allowing 
someone to “take[] advantage of such information knowing it is 
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”54  Gintel, though he was not 
an officer or director, was nevertheless an “insider” because he had a 
relationship giving him access to the information.  Subsequent courts have 
grappled with how far to extend liability for insider trading55 and have even 
gone so far as to extend liability to tippers and tippees.56 
C. Courts Imply a Private Right of Action Under Rule 10b-5 
While the SEC, in promulgating Rule 10b-5, declined to specify the 
remedies available upon breach,57 courts have implied a private right of 
action under the Rule.58  The first court to do so was the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.59  In deliberating whether 
defendants had fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to sell their stock in two 
corporations, as a first-order matter the court found that the plaintiffs could 
properly maintain a suit under Rule 10b-5.  The court noted that “[i]t is . . . 
true that there is no provision in Sec. 10 [of the ‘34 Act] or elsewhere 
expressly allowing civil suits by persons injured as a result of violation of 
Sec. 10 or of the Rule,” but reasoned that violating a statute either by acting 
or by failing to act could amount to an actionable tort “‘if . . . (a) the intent 
of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other 
as an individual . . . and (b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment 
is intended to protect.’”60 
Since Kardon, courts have refined the elements required to sustain a 
private right of action.61  A prima facie showing of a Rule 10b-5 violation 
 
 54.  Id. at 912. 
 55.  See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that mere 
possession of nonpublic market information does not cause a duty to disclose). 
 56.  See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (finding that a tippee has a duty 
to abstain from trading on material, nonpublic information if the tipper has breached his 
fiduciary duty by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should 
know of that breach).  This type of liability has been referred to as “outsider trading.”  See 
Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense:  An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading 
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 198 (1991) (explaining that “[t]rading of this type is 
frequently described as ‘outsider trading,’ so denominated because the traders are outsiders 
with respect to the issuer of the securities they trade”). 
 57.  See Exchange Act Release No. 34-3230, 1942 WL 34443 (May 21, 1942) 
(explaining that securities fraud is a prohibited but failing to lay out any remedies).  
 58.  See, e.g., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940) (stating 
that “[t]he power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right of recovery 
afforded by the [‘33 Act]”). 
 59.  69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 60.  Id. at 513 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286). 
 61.  See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975) 
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in the case of an individual requires six elements:  “(1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter (a wrongful state of mind), (3) a 
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or 
sale of a security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, (5) 
economic loss, and (6) loss causation.”62 
The second component of a private cause of action, scienter, was first 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder63 in 1976.  
Plaintiffs, who were customers of First Securities Company of Chicago, a 
securities brokerage firm, were induced to invest in a fraudulent investment 
scheme carried out by the company’s president and majority shareholder.64  
After the president confessed the scheme in a suicide note, the plaintiffs 
sued First Securities’ long-time auditing firm, Ernst & Ernst, on the theory 
that the auditors had “aided and abetted” the president’s violations of Rule 
10b-5 by failing to properly audit the company.65  The plaintiffs’ theory 
then amounted to a claim of negligent nonfeasance.66  In reversing the 
Seventh Circuit and resolving a circuit split on the issue,67 the Supreme 
Court held that a private cause of action for damages may not be 
maintained without any claim of “‘scienter’ — intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.”68 
The SEC, in contrast with a private plaintiff, generally needs only to 
prove four elements to establish liability for a Rule 10b-5 violation:  “(1) a 
 
(affirming a Second Circuit decision limiting private rights of action to plaintiffs who are 
actual purchasers or sellers of securities). 
 62.  Stanley Veliotis, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans and Insiders’ Incentive to 
Misrepresent, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 313, 316 (2010). 
 63.  425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 64.  Id. at 189. 
 65.  Id. at 189-90. 
 66.  Id. at 190. 
 67.  Prior to Ernst & Ernst, the courts of appeals had split on whether negligence was 
sufficient for liability to attach in a securities violation case.  Several courts of appeals held 
that some form of negligence was sufficient.  See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 
(9th Cir. 1974) (discussing courts that held negligence was sufficient); Myzel v. Fields, 386 
F.2d 718, 746-48 (8th Cir. 1967) (expanding the concept of fraud to include innocent 
nondislcosures); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding that 
intent to mislead is not required).  Other courts, however, had held that something more than 
negligence must be proved to find a defendant liable.  See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 
1351, 1361-1362 (10th Cir. 1974) (requiring more than simple negligence); Lanza v. Drexel 
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2nd Cir. 1973) (finding that reckless or willful or reckless 
disregard for the truth is required).  The Supreme Court pointed out in Ernst & Ernst that, in 
a few cases, the appeals courts have held that negligence was sufficient for liability, but 
have paradoxically gone on to find the defendants not liable despite their actions being 
negligent.  Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (citing Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 
489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); Kohn v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286 (3d 
Cir. 1972)). 
 68.  Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added).  
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material misrepresentation, (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security, (3) scienter, and (4) use of the jurisdictional means.”69  This 
means that the Commission does not need to show the fifth and sixth 
elements of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5, economic loss and 
loss causation.70  Also in contrast with private plaintiffs, the Department of 
Justice (at the behest of the SEC)71 may bring a criminal enforcement 
action against a party for Rule 10b-5 violations.72  A criminal enforcement 
proceeding requires an additional showing of “willfulness” for liability to 
attach.73 
D. The Split of Authorities Surrounding the Scienter Requirement for 
Insider Trading 
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Ernst & Ernst purported to 
resolve one circuit split, it inadvertently furthered another — one that 
ultimately resulted in the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 10b5-1.  The 
requirement that a party have acted with the requisite state of mind seemed 
clear enough; however, applying that element became much less clear in 
practice.  To what notion should the party’s scienter attach?  Must he 
knowingly possess material, nonpublic information, or must he knowingly 
base his decision to trade (or to refrain from trading) on that information?74  
In the first instance, an allegation of insider trading becomes much more of 
a strict liability type of claim75 while the later poses a much higher burden 
on the plaintiff.76 
 
 69.  Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183, 1192 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted); 
M. P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic Impact of 
Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1608 (2007). 
 70.  See id. at 1608 n.51 (explaining that, unlike a private cause of action, the SEC does 
not need to show reliance or loss causation). 
 71.  See Linda Chatman Thomsen, International Institute for Securities Market 
Development:  An Overview of Enforcement, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N 1 (2005), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_enforce/overviewenfor.pdf (explaining that 
criminal enforcement actions are done through the DOJ and U.S. Attorney’s offices and that 
the SEC assists in these efforts by providing access to its investigative files and assigning 
staff to assist in the prosecutions). 
 72.  Griffin Finan et al., Securities Fraud, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1129, 1132 (2011). 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  See Karen Schoen, Insider Trading:  The “Possession Versus Use” Debate, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 239, 249-52 (1999) (discussing the differences between these two standards). 
 75.  See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068 n.25 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A] 
knowing-possession standard would, we think, go a long way toward making insider trading 
a strict liability crime.”). 
 76.  See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The strongest argument 
that has been articulated in support of the knowing possession test is that a strict use test 
would pose serious difficulties of proof for the SEC.”). 
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The SEC, for its part, has been in favor of the strict liability approach, 
advocating for knowing possession to be sufficient to prove scienter, since 
at least 1978.77  In a hearing before a House Subcommittee relating to the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, for example, the SEC General 
Counsel at the time, Daniel Goelzer, indicated that the Commission’s 
“consistent position has been that possession of material inside information 
is the test,” while also noting that in adjudicative decisions, the 
Commission had not always prevailed on that ground.78  In a later address, 
Goelzer affirmed the Commission’s commitment to the knowing 
possession test to determine liability for insider trading over the “more 
stringent” use test but admitted that, in situations “where the trader has a 
‘plausible argument that complicates proof’, the SEC will be ‘cautious’ 
about bringing the case.”79 
Courts have not always agreed with the SEC, although some earlier 
cases lend support for the Commission’s view.  In SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co.,80 the Second Circuit expounded upon the idea, first advocated 
in Cady, Roberts,  that an insider in possession of material, nonpublic 
information must either disclose the information prior to trading or abstain 
altogether (known as “disclose or abstain”).81  As the en banc court stated: 
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either 
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from 
disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he 
chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or 
recommending the securities concerned while such inside 
information remains undisclosed.82 
This language seems to suggest the presence of only two options and, as a 
corollary, the absence of a middle ground for possession of material, 
nonpublic information and trading without basing the decision to act on the 
insider information.  However, the court points out that the rationale for 
Rule 10b-5 is to prevent: 
 
 77.  Id. at 1336 n.28.  But see Schoen, supra note 74, at 254 (“Despite the assertion by 
SEC Enforcement Director William R. McLucas that the Commission has always advocated 
‘knowing possession’ as the appropriate rule for insider trading liability, the SEC has been 
inconsistent in its interpretation of the rule.”). 
 78.  Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation:  Hearing on H.R. 
559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Consumer Prot., and Fin. of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 48-49 (1983) (statement of Daniel Goelzer, SEC 
General Counsel). 
 79.  Adler, 137 F.3d at 1336 n.28 (quoting 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1820, 1821 
(1983)). 
 80.  401 F.2d 833 (1968). 
 81.  Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. 
 82.  Id. 
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[A]nyone who, trading for his own account in the securities of a 
corporation has “access, directly or indirectly, to information 
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for 
the personal benefit of anyone” . . . [from] tak[ing] “advantage of 
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom 
he is dealing[.]”83 
By this view, the actual harm stems from the taking advantage of insider 
information, rather than mere possession coincident with a trade. 
In the midst of the development of the possession-versus-use debate, 
Congress took action in a manner that could be interpreted as attempting to 
resolve the dispute.  In response to a perceived rise in the incidence of 
insider trading as a result of mergers and tender offers, as well as the 
growth in options markets,84 Congress amended the ‘34 Act through 
enactment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (“ITSA”).  The 
ITSA afforded the SEC authority to pursue treble damages in a civil case 
for securities fraud.  In other words, the parties who were alleged to have 
engaged in violations of the federal securities laws “by purchasing or 
selling a security . . . while in possession of material, nonpublic 
information” could be subject to a penalty of up to thrice the gains garnered 
or losses avoided.85  Despite the fact that Congress used the language “in 
possession” in the ITSA, the legislative history of the Act belies the claim 
that Congress intended to alter the common law definition of insider 
trading, which generally required the decision to engage in or abstain from 
trading to be based on the material, nonpublic information.86  
The Second Circuit again entered the possession-versus-use fray years 
after Texas Gulf Sulphur, in its 1993 opinion, United States v. Teicher.87  In 
Teicher, the Second Circuit agreed with the SEC that no connection need 
be shown between the inside information and use thereof; possession is 
enough.88  The Second Circuit remarked, albeit in dicta, that: 
[A]s the government points out, both § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
 
 83.  Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 40 
S.E.C. 907, 912 (Nov. 8, 1961) (emphasis added)). 
 84.  Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation:  Hearing on H.R. 
559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Consumer Prot., and Fin. of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 48-49 (1983). 
 85.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-1(a)(1)-(2) (2012). 
 86.  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 1 (1983) (stating that the purpose of the amendment is 
to enable the SEC to recover in court “a civil money penalty to up to three times the amount 
of profit gained or loss avoided by a person who violates, or aids and abets a violation of, 
the federal securities laws by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of 
material nonpublic information”) (emphasis added).  
 87.  987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 88.  Id. 
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require only that a deceptive practice be conducted “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”  We have 
previously stated that the “in connection with” clause must be 
“construed . . . flexibly to include deceptive practices ‘touching’ 
the sale of securities, a relationship which has been described as 
‘very tenuous indeed.’”89 
Given this broad construction, the court expressed incredulity as to how 
anyone could adhere to the use test.  It cited, as additional support, the 
notion of “disclose or abstain,” stating that: 
[A] “knowing possession” standard comports with the oft-quoted 
maxim that one with a fiduciary or similar duty to hold material 
nonpublic information in confidence must either “disclose or 
abstain” with regard to trading.  When the fiduciary is an insider 
who is not in a position to make a public announcement, the 
fiduciary must abstain.90 
In SEC v. Adler, the Eleventh Circuit took an opposing view to both 
the SEC and the Second Circuit, saying that a showing of use of the inside 
information in making a trading decision was necessary to convict.91  In a 
well-articulated opinion that details the history of the debate, the Eleventh 
Circuit acknowledged that the use test did impose a higher burden of proof 
on the plaintiff because it required connecting scienter and causation.  
However, the court believed it could overcome this problem by imposing a 
presumption of use: 
It is true that it often would be difficult for the SEC to have to 
prove that an insider used the inside information, i.e., that the 
inside information has a causal connection to a particular trade.  
However, we believe that the SEC’s problems in this regard are 
sufficiently alleviated by the inference of use that arises from the 
fact that an insider traded while in possession of inside 
information.92 
The court further noted that its approach was the one that best fit with 
legislative intent and judicial precedent, both of which contradicted a strict 
liability regime for knowing possession of insider information coincident 
with a trade.93  Additionally, it said, both the statutory scheme and Supreme 
Court precedent supported a use requirement, as evidenced by a consistent 
focus on fraud and deception.94  Finally, the court noted that if its test 
 
 89.  Id. at 120. 
 90.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 91.  137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 92.  Id. (internal footnote omitted). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 1338. 
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proved unworkable, the SEC could simply adopt a new rule “as the SEC 
has done in the context of tender offers, or a rule adopting a presumption 
approach in which proof that an insider traded while in possession of 
material nonpublic information would shift the burden of persuasion on the 
use issue to the insider.”95 
Within months of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the Ninth Circuit 
also took up the question of what standard would be applicable to scienter 
in the context of insider trading and it too held, in United States v. Smith, 
that both possession and use were necessary elements.96  In Smith, the SEC 
brought a claim against Richard Smith, a vice president for a California-
based software design firm, alleging that Smith’s bulk selloff of his 
company stock within a one-week period and simultaneous short selling 
amounted to violations of Rule 10b-5.97  The District Court had given the 
jury an instruction regarding the requisite scienter that suggested mere 
possession was sufficient to find Smith liable, stating, “[T]he government 
need not prove that the defendant sold or sold short [company] stock solely 
because of the material nonpublic information.”98  The Ninth Circuit, in 
reversing the lower court’s decision, recognized that its standard would 
increase the difficulty of the prosecution proving its case.99  Nonetheless, it 
thought the burden was “by no means insuperable,” and that “[a]ny number 
of types of circumstantial evidence might be relevant to the causation 
issue.”100 
II. CLARIFICATION OF THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT AND BIRTH 
OF THE 10B5-1 PLAN 
The Eleventh Circuit’s suggestion in Adler that the SEC could 
promulgate a new rule if it found the use test unworkable proved somewhat 
prescient:  The SEC took up the court’s proposal and was considering what 
was to become of Rule 10b5-1 before the end of the following year.101  The 
SEC rule was initially proposed Rule 10b5-1 on December 20, 1999102 and, 
after a comment period, the final rule published on August 24, 2000, with 
 
 95.  Id. at 1337 n.33. 
 96.  155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 97.  Id. at 1053-54. 
 98.  Id. at 1066. 
 99.  Id. at 1069. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,600 (Dec. 
28, 1999) (acknowledging the Adler court’s suggestion and proposing Rule 10b5-1 to 
address the possession/use issue). 
 102.  Id. at 72,611. 
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an effective date of October 23, 2000.103 
In the Adopting Release, the SEC specifically stated that its goal in 
promulgating Rule 10b5-1 was to provide guidance on “what, if any, causal 
connection must be shown between the trader’s possession of inside 
information and his or her trading.”104  Not surprisingly, the Commission 
adopted its prior view of the requisite connection, which was that “knowing 
possession” of material, nonpublic information in conjunction with trading 
was sufficient for liability.105  As the Commission stated: 
[W]e believe that awareness, rather than use, most effectively 
serves the fundamental goal of insider trading law — protecting 
investor confidence in market integrity.  The awareness standard 
reflects the common sense notion that a trader who is aware of 
inside information when making a trading decision inevitably 
makes use of the information.  Additionally, a clear awareness 
standard will provide greater clarity and certainty than a 
presumption or “strong inference” approach.106 
Recognizing that corporate executives are often in possession of 
confidential information and often trade in their own company’s stock 
(given, for example, that a significant portion of executive compensation is 
in the form of stock options107), however, the SEC also adopted a new 
affirmative defense, the 10b5-1 plan.108  The 10b5-1 plan, according to the 
Commission, was created to protect insiders who were in possession of 
insider information but who nonetheless did not base their trading decision 
on the material.  The defense aimed to afford insiders the ability “to plan 
securities transactions in advance at a time when they are not aware of 
material nonpublic information, and then carry out those pre-planned 
transactions at a later time, even if they later become aware of material 
nonpublic information.”109 
A. Requirements of a 10b5-1 Trading Plan 
To effectively meet an allegation of insider trading, a 10b5-1 plan 
 
 103.  Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 
2000).  Rule 10b5-1 was issued on August 15, 2000.  Id. at 51,740. 
 104.  Id. at 51,727. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See Richard A. Booth, Why Stock Options Are the Best Form of Executive 
Compensation (and How to Make Them Even Better), 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 281, 282-83 
(2010) (noting that one study found stock options for two hundred CEOs yielding more than 
half their total pay). 
 108.  Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. 
 109.  Id. at 51,728. 
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must:  (1) be established in good faith at a time when the participant does 
not possess material, nonpublic information; (2) pre-ordain trading price 
and volume (or provide a formula to determine price and number of 
securities to be traded); (3) prohibit a participant from later exerting 
influence over the method or timing of transactions or whether the trade 
takes place at all; and, (4) disallow a participant to change or deviate from 
the plan terms except to cancel a plan, which the participant may do even if 
he or she is in possession of insider information at that point.110  The plans 
then can be challenged on a number of fronts, including whether the insider 
entered into the plan after coming into possession of material, nonpublic 
information111 or whether the insider entered into the plan in good faith and 
not as part of a scheme to evade insider trading liability.112  Additionally, a 
plan participant cannot get around a plan by taking a hedging position on 
any transaction provided for in the plan.113 
Both companies and insiders for the most part quickly embraced the 
new 10b5-1 plans.  The sheer number of press releases announcing the 
adoption of plans by corporate executives suggests that many companies 
tout adoption of a 10b5-1 plan to boost consumer confidence.114  Other 
companies appear to disclose executives’ participation in the plans to ward 
off litigation.115  If they do not deter plaintiffs from filing suit altogether, 
 
 110.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)-(ii) (2012); Elizabeth Noe & Rey Pascual, Stay 
Current:  Federal Prosecutors And Regulators Target 10B5-1 Plans - How To Mitigate 
Exposure And Maximize Compliance, PAUL HASTINGS 2 (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/2327.pdf. 
 111.  See Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Trading Plans Under Fire:  Despite 2007 
Warning, Experts Say Loopholes Remain for Corporate Insiders, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 
2012, at C1 (noting that executives are “vulnerable” if they set up a Rule 10b5-1 plan while 
already in possession of inside information). 
 112.  See Noe & Pascual, supra note 110, at 2 (prioritizing the good faith requirement as 
supreme). 
 113.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C) (2012). 
 114.  See, e.g., Press Release, PRNewswire, Scripps Officers Adopt 10b5-1 Trading 
Plans (Dec. 28, 2012), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/scripps-
officers-adopt-10b5-1-trading-plans-185048111.html (publicizing the idea that the Rule 
10b5-1 plans allow the officers to diversify their personal holdings and fund the payment of 
tax liabilities); Noe & Pascual, supra note 110, at 3 (advising clients to “[c]onsider public 
disclosure of Rule 10b5-1 plans[,] [because] [a]lthough public disclosure is not required, 
and there may be certain disadvantages to disclosing planned stock sales by executives, it 
ensures a public record of the plan’s existence, and may also assist if civil securities class 
action litigation is filed.”). 
 115.  See, e.g., Press Release, Business Wire, Vringo Issues Statement About Recent 
Director And Officer Transactions Pursuant To Rule 10B5-1 Trading Plans (Jan. 29, 2013), 
available at http://www.thestreet.com/story/11825087/1/vringo-issues-statement-about-
recent-director-and-officer-transactions-pursuant-to-rule-10b5-1-trading-plans.html (noting 
that recent transactions by officers and directors pertaining to restricted stock units were 
pursuant to legal Rule 10b5-1 plans and will be reported to the SEC). 
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they at least put them on notice that pursuing litigation against the insiders 
will not be an easy task. 
III. LOOPHOLES HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED AND EXPLOITED IN 
10B5-1 PLANS 
Despite the SEC’s assertion that Rule 10b5-1 and the affirmative 
defense would “clarify and enhance existing prohibitions against insider 
trading,”116 over time, they instead give insiders ample opportunity to not 
only engage in insider trading, but also hide behind a legally sanctioned 
shield.  Weaknesses in the affirmative defense in particular include that 
insiders do not have to disclose the existence of the plans; nor do they have 
to reveal the specific provisions of their plans, and they are able to cancel 
their plan at any time without disclosing the plan’s cancellation.117  
Moreover, insiders can legally implement a plan immediately before the 
point when they come into possession of material, nonpublic information.  
There is no requirement that a plan be in place for a pre-specified amount 
of time before trades begin.118  Finally, even when an insider participates in 
a 10b5-1 plan, he is free to trade outside of it.119 
The ability of insiders to withhold from investors the existence of 
10b5-1 plans or their provisions, as well as the ability to change or 
discontinue them without disclosure, provides ample opportunity for 
abuse.120  This means that corporate executives can put plans in place and 
then decide at the critical moment (when a definitive merger agreement is 
executed and public announcement is imminent, for example) whether or 
not to leave the plan in place, which will result in a trade.121  Moreover, the 
ability to cancel the plan at any time can be a way to avoid losses.  For 
example, Former Qwest Communications International CEO Joseph 
Nacchio was convicted of nineteen counts of insider trading in 2007 after 
 
 116.  Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 
2000). 
 117.  See Veliotis, supra note 62, at 326-30. 
 118.  See Brandon C. Parris, Rule 10b5-1 Plans:  Staying Out of Trouble, 17 BUS. L. 
TODAY 21, 23 (2008) (noting that there are no limitations regarding the timeline/length of 
Rule 10b5-1 plans, thus implying that there is no requirement for a plan to be in place for a 
pre-specified period before a trade). 
 119.  See Id. at 24 (noting the lack of formal restrictions on executives trading outside of 
the Rule 10b5-1 plans). 
 120.  See Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 111 (noting that executives need not disclose 
their Rule 10b5-1 plans, one of the loopholes that possibly contributes to executives having 
the ability to conduct inside trades). 
 121.  See Justin Lahart, For Insiders, It’s All in the Timing, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2012, 
at C10 (discussing that executives can implement Rule 10b5-1 plans while anticipating 
certain transactions and decide, at a later time, whether to trade or not). 
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selling off more than $50 million in company stock in 2001 when he knew 
the company’s future prospects were deteriorating.122  The SEC 
successfully contended that Nacchio had accelerated trades made under a 
10b5-1 plan after learning that Qwest would miss revenue targets.123  
Alternatively, if insiders come into possession of material, nonpublic 
information that is better than anticipated and they are supposed to buy, 
they may decrease the “buy” price or amount of shares to be purchased. 
Even if insiders participate in a 10b5-1 plan, they are free to trade 
outside of the plan.124  This increases the difficulty of determining whether 
a given transaction took place within the boundaries of a plan, where it is 
prima facie beyond a charge of insider trading, or whether it was performed 
outside the plan, where it would be much more vulnerable.  One could 
imagine a situation in which an insider could exploit both the ability to 
conceal the plan terms and the ability to trade outside the plan.  The insider 
could implement a plan and concurrently trade outside of it, then later 
change the terms of the plan to encompass the outside trades as well.  This 
would essentially provide insiders with backward-looking immunity. 
One of the most salient examples of the egregiousness of these 
loopholes involves the CEO of Big Lots, Steve Fishman.  In March 2012, 
Fishman sold some $10 million of company stock, outside of his pre-
determined trading schedule set forth in his 10b5-1 plan.125  One month 
later, Big Lots shares plummeted by twenty-four percent.126  Subsequently, 
the Wall Street Journal reported that Fishman was the subject of a criminal 
probe.127  After both a class action against Big Lots and a suit against 
Fishman were filed, Fishman announced his retirement.128  Big Lots’ 
general counsel maintained that Fishman’s announcement had “nothing to 
 
 122.  Carrie Johnson, Nacchio Guilty of Insider Trading, WASH. POST (April 20, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/04/19/AR2007041902738.html. 
 123.  Peter J. Henning, The Fine Line Between Legal, and Illegal, Insider Trading, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/the-
fine-line-between-legal-and-illegal-insider-trading/. 
 124.  See Parris, supra note 118, at 24. 
 125.  Susan Pulliam & Michael Rothfeld, FBI Probes Big Lots Chief, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
8, 2012, 2:03 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324640104578163674282467766. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id.; see also infra notes 169-178 and accompanying text (outlining Big Lots’ stock 
activity during Fishman’s term as CEO).  
 128.  Press Release, PRNewswire, Big Lots Announces CEO Planned Retirement And 
Transition Plan For The Coming Year (Dec. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/big-lots-announces-ceo-planned-retirement-and-
transition-plan-for-the-coming-year-181998961.html. 
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do with the (Wall Street Journal) article or the investigation.”129 
Yet another loophole in 10b5-1 plans is the absence of rules about 
how long the trading plan must be in place before trading can begin under 
the plan.  As the Wall Street Journal reported in November 2012, 
Chairman and CEO of flooring manufacturer Mohawk Industries, Jeffrey 
Lorberbaum, established a 10b5-1 plan just six days prior to engaging in 
significant trades in company stock.130  After setting up his plan on March 
9, 2006,131 Lorberbaum began selling stock through a family partnership on 
March 15, eventually selling off approximately $10.4 million over the 
course of two weeks.  One day after the last stock sale, Mohawk reported a 
downward revision in quarterly earnings expectations;132 the following 
trading day, the company’s stock fell by nearly 5.5 percent, representing 
the largest one-day decline in over two years.133  According to the Journal, 
Loberbaum’s sales prior to the stock price decline allowed him to sidestep 
approximately $700,000 in losses.134  Mohawk’s stock price, the Journal 
reported, did not recover for the better part of a year.135 
In addition to more overt abuses of 10b5-1 plans resulting from 
ambiguities in SEC Rule 10b5-1, the safe harbor provided by the plans may 
motivate insiders to actively misrepresent company information.136 
A. Academic Literature Suggests Plans Fail to Curb Insider Trading 
The forgoing discussion of loopholes in 10b5-1 plans suggests that 
these plans have substantially failed to curb insider trading.  However, 
empirical data both confirms and, to some extent, quantifies the problems 
associated with 10b5-1 plans.  Todd Henderson, a law professor at the 
University of Chicago who has studied abuses of these plans, indicated the 
plans may even increase insider trading, saying in an interview with the 
 
 129.  Tim Feran, Big Lots:  Retirement Isn’t Tied to SEC Probe, COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Dec. 6, 2012, 5:44 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2012/12/06/big-
lots-retirement-isnt-tied-to-sec-probe.html. 
 130.  Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. 
 131.  The partnership’s purported reason for entering into the plan was that plan was “a 
component of its overall diversification strategy and tax planning.” Lorberbaum Group 
Preparing to Sell Mohawk Shares, FLOOR DAILY (Mar. 10, 2006), 
http://www.floordaily.net/flooring-
news/lorberbaum_group_preparing_to_sell_mohawk_shares.aspx. 
 132.  Press Release, SEC, Mohawk Industries, Inc. Announces Earnings Guidance 
Adjustment (Mar. 30, 2006), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/851968/000085196806000035/eg3302005.htm.  
 133.  Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Veliotis, supra note 62, at 314. 
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Wall Street Journal that “‘[t]his [creation of the 10b5-1 plan affirmative 
defense] was a huge gift to insiders’ . . . ‘The SEC claimed this would 
reduce the probability of insider trading but it has had the opposite 
effect.’”137 
A 2009 study by Professor Alan Jagolinzer corroborates Henderson’s 
comment.  Jagolinzer analyzed 3,426 insiders at 1,241 firms138 and found 
that, in general, 10b5-1 plan participants generate significant abnormal 
returns when compared with insiders from the same firms who did not 
participate in a plan.139  The data indicates that plan participants were able 
to do so by terminating plans in advance of positive news events and by 
entering into sales commitments ahead of negative news announcements.140  
The majority of 10b5-1 plan transactions were sales.141 
A 2012 study by Henderson, Jagolinzer, and Muller expanded 
Jagolinzer’s 2009 study by exploring insiders’ rationale for disclosing 
10b5-1 plan participation.142  The authors found that voluntary plan 
disclosure was a litigation tactic designed to “create legal cover for 
opportunistic insider trading.”143  Specifically, the data revealed that 
abnormal returns to a company are significantly more negative when 
following insider sales within a voluntarily disclosed 10b5-1 plan,144 
suggesting the insider auspiciously avoided a loss on his sale by selling in 
advance of bad news.  The abnormal returns companies experienced were 
generally associated with a significant decline in earnings in relation to 
market expectations.145  In about twenty-five percent of cases where plan 
details were specifically disclosed, the insider sold shortly before a non-
earnings related decline in the company’s stock price due to events such as 
announcement of a merger, a stock exchange-imposed trading halt, or a 
 
 137.  Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Disclosures on Trades is Sought, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
29, 2012, at C1. 
 138.  Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55 MGMT. SCI. 
224, 227 (2009), available at 
http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0928. 
 139.  Id. at 224. 
 140.  Id. at 235. 
 141.  Id. at 228.  Specifically, Jagolinzer found that 10b5-1 sales accounted for seventeen 
times the average total dollar volume of purchases, and that a plan participant was twenty-
nine times more likely to engage in a sale than a purchase during the observation period.  Id. 
 142.  M. Todd Henderson, Alan D. Jagolinzer, & Karl A. Muller III, Hiding in Plain 
Sight:  Can Disclosure Enhance Insiders’ Trade Returns? (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Gov. at 
Stanford Univ. Working Paper No. 7, Aug. 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1137928.  
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 2, 15-16. 
 145.  Id. at 17. 
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drug trial failure.146 
A study by Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski, while not focused 
specifically on 10b5-1 plans, also supports the argument that the 
affirmative defense does little to curb insider trading.147  In analyzing 
“opportunistic,” or irregular, insider traders, the authors observed that 
“trades of opportunistic insiders show[ed] significant predictive power for 
future news announcements about the firm, while routine trades by insiders 
[did] not.”148  The results were consistent with the authors’ hypothesis that 
transactions based on the insiders’ superior knowledge were less likely to 
be irregularly timed, while transactions made for liquidity or diversification 
reasons were more likely to be irregularly timed.149  The study was also 
harmonious with Jagolinzer’s 2009 study, the authors noted, because the 
data showed similar results both pre and post-adoption of the 10b5-1 plan 
defense.150 
B. Litigation Also Fails to Effectively Prevent Insider Trading 
Historically, litigation has not been an effective method of curbing 
10b5-1 plan abuses.  This may come as a surprise to some:  after all, recall 
that a 10b5-1 defense rests on the integrity of the plan itself; it will succeed 
as a defense “only when the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell 
securities was given or entered into in good faith and not as part of a plan 
or scheme to evade the prohibitions of this [rule].”151  In theory, this 
requirement should weed out those executives who establish a plan while 
already in possession of inside information — those who exhibit suspicious 
behavior like implementing or cancelling a plan within days of making 
significant, advantageous trades.  In practice, though, the good faith 
prerequisite does little, if anything, to poke holes in the 10b5-1 defense. 
One reason for the ineffectuality of adjudication is the fact that courts 
may only consider publicly available evidence at the motion to dismiss 
stage.152  Specifically, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), at 
 
 146.  Id. at 17-18. 
 147.  Lauren Cohen, Christopher Malloy & Lukasz Pomorski, Decoding Inside 
Information, 67 J. FIN. 1009, 1013, 1015-16 (2012), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01740.x/pdf. 
 148.  Id. at 1013. 
 149.  Id. at 1041. 
 150.  Id. at 1015-16.  The authors also found that opportunistic trading was significantly 
positively correlated with later SEC enforcement against the insider, and that opportunistic 
traders significantly decreased trading activity after SEC enforcement actions were 
highlighted in the news.  Id. at 1041.  
 151.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(ii) (2012). 
 152.  Henderson et al., supra note 142, at 4. 
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this point in the pleadings a court may only utilize “the pleadings 
themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits attached to the 
pleadings, and matters of public record.”153  As an evidentiary matter, a 
court may also consider matters that are “generally known” or that “can be 
accurately or readily determined” from trustworthy sources,154 which 
includes SEC filings.155  The only indications the court would have that an 
executive’s establishment of a 10b5-1 plan was not in good faith, therefore, 
would be “matters of public record”156 or matters “generally known”157 that 
tended to show the plan was established while the executive was in 
possession of insider information.  Because insider information is, by its 
terms, nonpublic, one can see the conundrum plaintiffs face in successfully 
challenging a 10b5-1 plan defense at the motion to dismiss stage. 
Add to these constraints the heightened pleading standard for a Rule 
10b-5 violation imposed under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 (PSLRA),158 and little is left to stop 10b5-1 plan abuses via judicial 
enforcement.  Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Electrical 
Services Inc.,159 a 2007 case heard by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
offers a typical example of how such securities class actions proceed under 
the PSLRA.  In Central Laborers’ Pension Fund, the plaintiffs alleged that 
defendants, executives of a publicly traded corporation, had materially 
 
 153.  Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 154.  FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(1)-(2); see also Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 
773 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a district court must limit itself to facts stated in the complaint or in 
documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in the complaint by 
reference.”).  The pleadings encompass the complaint as well as answers.  FED. R. CIV. P. 
7(a)(1)-(2).  Answers, in turn, lay out the affirmative defenses, listed in FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).  
A party would, under Rule 8(c), state the existence of a 10b5-1 plan in response to an 
allegation of insider trading.   
 155.  Kramer, 937 F.2d at 773 (rejecting an argument that SEC filings should not be 
considered at the motion to dismiss stage because they were not sufficiently incorporated in 
the complaint). 
 156.  City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d at 498.  
 157.  FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(1). 
 158.  Pub. L. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.).  The PSLRA imposed heightened pleading requirements for scienter in cases 
alleging violations of § 10b and Rule 10b-5, in large part because of concern over frivolous 
securities class action lawsuits.  Daniela Nanau, Analyzing Post-Market Boom 
Jurisprudence in the Second and Ninth Circuits:  Has the Pendulum Really Swung Too Far 
in Favor of Plaintiffs?, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 943, 961-64 (2006).  The 
heightened standard calls for pleadings with particularity strong inferences of scienter, and it 
was clarified by the Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. to mean 
that “[a] complaint will survive . . . only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of 
scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from 
the facts alleged.”  551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007). 
 159.  497 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund]. 
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misrepresented the health of the company, resulting in harm to the 
plaintiffs.160  To rebut plaintiff’s allegation that defendants had the requisite 
scienter161 in making misrepresentations because, among other things, 
company executives had engaged in suspicious trading activity, defendant 
executives raised a 10b5-1 plan defense.162 
The Fifth Circuit noted in passing that the 10b5-1 plan in question did 
not appear to meet the good faith requirement.163  Nonetheless, the 
pleadings, taken together, failed to “permit a strong inference of 
scienter.”164  Given the enhanced pleading requirement for scienter and the 
fact that allegations of insider trading are often advanced as but one piece 
of circumstantial evidence in favor of a finding of scienter, it is 
unsurprising that 10b5-1 plans themselves lose significance in a broader 
section 10(b) case.165 
On the other hand, procedural constraints have not entirely deprived 
litigation of its teeth in curbing 10b5-1 plan manipulations:  Some 
exploitations of 10b5-1 plans have been so egregious that courts cannot 
overlook them.  The majority of these cases are associated with a high-
profile scandal.  In 2010, for example, former CEO of Countrywide 
Financial, Angelo Mozilo, was ordered to pay a record $67.5 million to 
 
 160.  Id. at 549. 
 161.  The “requisite scienter” in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations, which were alleged 
here, is “either intent or severe recklessness.”  Id. at 551 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted) (emphasis in original).  Severe recklessness, in turn, is: 
[L]imited to those highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that 
involve not merely simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme 
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and that present a danger of 
misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or is so 
obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it. 
Id. (quoting Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 408 (2001)). 
 162.  Id. at 554. 
 163.  See id. (remarking that company CFO William Reynolds had entered into his 10b5-
1 plan during the class period and that the defendant had failed to respond to this allegation; 
therefore, “the insider trading allegations contribute[d] to an inference of scienter on the part 
of Reynolds.”). 
 164.  Id. at 555. 
 165.  For examples of similar cases glossing over the validity of a Rule 10b5-1 plan in 
the context of a broader § 10(b) case, see Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 
F.3d 1049, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting, in a larger discussion of whether defendants in a 
securities fraud class action possessed the requisite level of scienter, that two defendants had 
executed the majority of their trades pursuant to a 10b5-1 plan but giving that fact no weight 
either way); Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 928-29 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding no inference of 
the requisite level of scienter where defendants’ stock sales were made pursuant to Rule 
10b5-1 trading plans but omitting to discuss whether the plans themselves were undertaken 
in good faith); and In re NutriSystem, Inc. Sec. Litig., 653 F. Supp. 2d 563, 576 (E.D. Pa. 
2009) (concluding that plaintiffs failed to plead facts specific to support a finding that 
defendants entered into Rule 10b5-1 plans while aware of insider information). 
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settle an SEC case charging Mozilo and two former Countrywide 
executives with deliberately misleading investors about the deteriorating 
condition of the company, described as “a looming disaster in which 
Countrywide was buckling under the weight of increasing risky mortgage 
underwriting, mounting defaults and delinquencies, and a deteriorating 
business model.”166  Forty-five million of the settlement was attributed to 
“disgorgement of ill-gotten gains” associated with Mozilo’s alleged insider 
trading.167  In one of several related securities class actions, the Central 
District of California District Court noted that Mozilo’s excessive 
amendments to his plans “appear[ed] to defeat the very purpose of 10b5–1 
plans.”168 
IV. INTEREST IN REFORMING 10B5-1 PLANS GAINS WIDESPREAD 
SALIENCE 
A. The Media Shines the Spotlight on 10b5-1 Plans 
Although it has commonly been acknowledged within the corporate 
world that executives are abusing 10b5-1 plans, the problems with such 
plans gained importance among a more widespread audience in November 
2012, when the Wall Street Journal published an exposé on the topic.169  
The article, titled Executives’ Good Luck in Trading Own Stock, studied 
thousands of SEC filings from 2004 that disclosed instances in which 
corporate executives traded their own company’s stock within the five-day 
period proceeding company disclosure of material information.170 
What the Journal found was arguably unimpressive:  Of the more than 
twenty-thousand executives who traded in their own company’s stock 
during the relevant time period, only about seven percent experienced gains 
of more than ten percent (or avoided losses of the same amount) within the 
week following disclosure of material news, while only half that number 
experienced losses of ten percent or more.171  Given that insiders are 
intimately familiar with both their industry and their company, it is not 
 
 166.  Blake Ellis, Countrywide’s Mozilo to Pay $67.5 Million Settlement, CNNMONEY 
(Oct. 15, 2010, 5:16 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/15/news/companies/mozilo_SEC/index.htm?hpt=T2.  
 167.  Press Release, SEC, Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC’s 
Largest-Ever Financial Penalty Against a Public Company’s Senior Executive (Oct. 15, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm.  
 168.  In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 
2009). 
 169.  Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
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shocking that they would record abnormal gains and avoid abnormal losses, 
even if they were not in possession of material, nonpublic information at 
the time of a trade.172  The cynical mind might go so far as to assume that 
executives frequently engage in insider trading, thus rendering it similarly 
unsurprising that executives who “dip[] in and out” of the market, as 
opposed to those who “follow a consistent yearly pattern in their trading,” 
tend to experience statistically better returns.173 
What the Journal article did expose, however, were the problems in 
determining whether executives who experienced those abnormal gains 
were protected by a valid 10b5-1 plan.  As the Journal quoted one hedge 
fund manager as saying, “Sometimes a 10b5-1 plan is legitimate and other 
times it’s not, but there is no way of knowing because there is no disclosure 
of anything to investors.”174  The article highlighted six corporate 
executives who sold stock, valued anywhere from $170,000 to $14 million, 
in advance of company disclosure of negative, market-moving news, and 
who consequently avoided significant losses.175  In five of the six cases, 
company spokespeople averred that the fortuitously timed trades were 
within the boundaries of 10b5-1 plans.176  The sixth instance, involving the 
sale of Big Lots stock by the company’s CEO, Steve Fishman, outside of a 
10b5-1 plan, is discussed in this Comment.177  Fishman’s sale of a 
significant amount of Big Lots stock allowed him to avoid a $2.4 million 
loss; despite that, a company representative stated that the trade in question 
was appropriately made “‘at a time when the company’s trading window 
was open.’”178 
The ensuing public response to the Wall Street Journal article 
highlighting abuses of 10b5-1 plans is an example of what scholars 
describe as a classic channel of demand for business law reform.179  They 
note that “[f]rom time to time, specific business issues acquire widespread 
 
 172.  See, e.g., Jagolinzer, supra note 138, at 237 (cautioning that “it is important to note 
that that evidence [indicating that insiders utilizing 10b5-1 plans experienced abnormal 
gains and avoided abnormal losses] is not necessarily indicative of illegal behavior”). 
 173.  Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. 
 174.  Id. (quoting David Berman of investment banking firm Berman Capital 
Management). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fishman and 
Big Lots. 
 178.  Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. 
 179.  John Armour, Jack B. Jacob & Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Comparative Analysis of 
Hostile Takeover Regimes in the US, UK and Japan 3-4 (Columbia Law and Econ., 
Working Paper No. 377, Aug. 12, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1657953. 
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political salience, leading to a populist demand for reform.”180  This often 
occurs, they say, in answer to a scandal, such as Enron and WorldCom.181 
Such scandals, in turn, have commonly been uncovered or brought to 
the fore by investigative journalism done by the Wall Street Journal.  The 
work of James B. Stewart of the Journal, regarding insider trading in the 
1980s, helped shine the spotlight on the prevalence of insider trading on 
Wall Street during that era.182  Because of the increased awareness of the 
systemic abuse, Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988, which extended the civil penalties for insider 
trading to employees who fail to prevent other employees from engaging in 
insider trading, and, like the ITSA, provided for treble damages.183  
Likewise, it was Journal reporter Jonathan Weil who brought Enron’s 
questionable accounting practices to the fore in his 2000 article, Energy 
Traders Cite Gains, But Some Math Is Missing.184  A few years later, in 
2006, the Journal also reported on a troubling pattern in several 
companies’ stock option granting practices,185 an effort for which it 
 
 180.  Id. at 4. 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Stewart and fellow Journal writer Daniel Hertzberg were awarded the Pulitzer 
Prize for Explanatory Journalism in 1988.  Explanatory Journalism, THE PULITZER PRIZES, 
http://www.pulitzer.org/bycat/Explanatory-Journalism (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).  Stewart 
and Hertzberg reported on Dennis Levine, an investment banker charged with setting up 
connections with numerous Wall Street professionals, all of whom engaged in insider 
trading.  Levine Receives Prison Term, $362,000 Fine, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1987, at 2.  
Stewart’s discoveries of the endemic insider trading and corruption on Wall Street at the 
time are chronicled in his 1992 best-selling book, Den of Thieves.   
 183.  Pub. L. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); see also supra, notes 84-86 and 
accompanying text. 
 184.  WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2000, at T1. 
 185.  See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday; Some CEOs Reap 
Millions by Landing Stock Options When They Are Most Valuable; Luck — Or Something 
Else?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006, at A1 (discussing Affiliated Computer Services Inc.’s 
granting of stock options to CEO Jeffery Rich from 1995 to 2002, all being dated before a 
rise in price and often after the price had experienced a steep decline); James Bandler & 
Jennifer Levitz, U.S. Intensifies Stock Options Probe; Subpoenas by Prosecutors in 
Manhattan Office Signal Major Step-Up in Security, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2006, at A3 
(discussing investigation by federal prosecutors into five different companies in an effort to 
discern whether effective dates on stock options were deliberately changed, or “backdated”); 
Jennifer Levitz, Investigation into Stock-Options Dating Widens, WALL ST. J., May 20, 
2006, at A2 (discussing three more companies that were investigated for improper stock 
options dating); Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Matter of Timing:  Five More Companies 
Show Questionable Options Pattern — Chip Industry’s KLA-Tencor Among Firms With 
Grants Before Stock-Price Jumps — A 20 Million-to-One Shot, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, 
at A1 (noting that a new statistical study indicated five more companies with questionable 
and improbable stock options granting patterns); Charles Forelle, How Journal Found 
Options Pattern, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at A11 (discussing the methodology used to 
identify questionable stock options granting patterns). 
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garnered the Pulitzer Prize,186 and which contributed to the prosecution of 
companies engaged in illegal backdating and increased disclosure rules 
regarding in-the-money option grants to executives.187 
The Journal appears to be leading the charge once again, having 
exposed widespread manipulation of 10b5-1 plans.  As a consequence, 
interest in reforming the use of such plans has generated movement from 
the SEC, action among various investor groups, and revised advice from 
the legal community. 
B. Various Stakeholders Suggest Fixes for 10b5-1 Plans 
Recognizing that there are numerous loopholes in 10b5-1 plans, 
different stakeholders are already pushing for change to ameliorate these 
problems.  The SEC itself recognized the potential for misuse intrinsic to 
the 10b5-1 affirmative defense and consequently attempted to close some 
of the loopholes as early as 2002.188  Reacting to what it described as 
“advances in technology and the increased dependence on the ready 
availability of current corporate information [that] have reshaped the way 
our markets operate,” the SEC proposed an amendment to Form 8-K, a 
filing made by companies to disclose material information an ongoing 
basis.189  The amendment would have made mandatory disclosure of 
“[e]ach director’s and executive officer’s adoption, modification or 
termination of a contract, instruction or written plan for the purchase or sale 
of company equity securities intended to satisfy the affirmative defense 
conditions of Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1(c) . . . .”190 
The SEC’s proposed adjustment to the 10b5-1 affirmative defense, 
 
 186.  Katharine Q. Seeyle & James Barron, Wall Street Journal Wins 2 Pulitzer Prizes; 
History of Civil Rights Reporting Also Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at B8. 
 187.  See Jonathan J. Tompkins, Opportunity Knocks, but the SEC Answers:  Examining 
the Manipulation of Stock Options Through the Spring-Loading of Grants and Rule 10b-5, 
26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 413, 417-18, 418 n.28 (2008) (noting that over one hundred 
companies were scrutinized by federal prosecutors, and that the SEC promulgated Final 
Rule:  Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 
8, 2006) to require thorough disclosure of in-the-money grants). 
 188.  Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions, 67. Fed. Reg. 19,914, 
19,914 (Apr. 23, 2002). 
 189.  Id. at 19,915.  For information on what must be disclosed on a Form 8-K, see Form 
8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2013). 
 190.  Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions, 67. Fed. Reg. at 
19,915.  Amending Form 8-K to require more timely disclosure of certain insider trades, the 
SEC believed, “would enable investors to make investment and voting decisions on a more 
timely and better informed basis, provide more timely information regarding management’s 
view of company performance or prospects, protect investors, and promote fair dealing in 
company equity securities . . . .”  Id. 
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however, was but one part of a broader proposal to make more timely 
disclosures regarding director and officer transactions in corporate equity 
securities.191  The majority of comments received in response to the 
proposed rule neglected to mention the affirmative defense at all.192  Those 
that did largely expressed opposition to the 10b5-1(c) aspects of the 
proposal, citing concerns regarding “creating opportunities for unfair 
arbitrage on an insider’s transactions,”193 and a fear of misleading or 
confusing investors, especially because insiders would still be free to trade 
outside of a plan.194  One of the lone voices in favor of the enhanced 
disclosure with regard to 10b5-1 plans was William Miller, then-CEO of 
Legg Mason Funds Management, who noted, “Under the current standard, 
shareholders are in the dark about amounts, timing, etc.  Since these plans 
can be changed frequently without current disclosure, important 
information may be obscured.  Having the plans, and especially changes to 
the plans, publicly disclosed is in the public interest.”195  The final rule 
adopted by the SEC ultimately made no mention of 10b5-1 plans.196 
 
 191.  See id. at 19,914 (“We are proposing amendments that would require some public 
companies to file current reports describing: directors’ and executive officers’ transactions 
in company equity securities . . . .”). 
 192.  See Comments on Proposed Rule:  Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management 
Transactions, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2013) (listing the 
comments, of which only a minority mention Rule 10b5-1). 
 193.  Letter from Stanley Keller, Chair of the Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Scott 
Spector, Chair of the Subcomm. on Emp. Benefits, Exec. Comp. and Section 16 & Anne G. 
Plimpton, Vice Chair of the Subcomm. on Emp. Benefits, Exec. Comp. and Section 16, to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 23 (July 12, 2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902/skeller.htm; see also Letter from Luke Farber, 
Derivatives Prods. Comm., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 6 
(June 24, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902/lfarber1.htm (“[D]isclosure of 
this information is unnecessary and could be harmful to the competitive position of the 
agent or counterparty.  Public release of such information also raises the risk of front-
running in advance of transactions.”). 
 194.  See Letter from Robert Singley, Vice President and Assistant Sec’y of Wells Fargo 
& Co., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (June 26, 2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902/rsingley.htm (expressing concerns about 
potential confusions to investors).  
 195.  Letter from William H. Miller, III, Chief Exec. Officer of Legg Mason Funds 
Mgmt., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (June 25, 2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902/wmiller.txt.  In 2006, Miller, whose opinion was 
ultimately discarded along with the proposed changes, was called “the greatest money 
manager of our time,” having beaten the market for fifteen consecutive years at that time.  




 196.  Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date; 
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In 2007, the SEC again appeared to be taking a harder look at 10b5-1 
plans, but once again, no changes ensued.  At the fifteenth annual National 
Association of Stock Plan Professionals in October 2007, then-Director of 
Enforcement for the SEC Linda Thomsen noted that the Commission was 
aware of the literature suggesting that the plans were being abused.197  
Thomsen stated: 
The date [sic] suggests that executives with plans sell more 
frequently and more strategically ahead of announcements of bad 
news.  This raises the possibility that plans are being abused 
essentially to facilitate trading on inside information. . . . If 
executives are in fact trading on inside information and using a 
plan for cover, the plan will provide no defense.198 
Despite Thomsen’s remarks, little regulatory movement toward 
increased disclosure or enforcement occurred for the next several years.  It 
was not until the November 2012 Wall Street Journal exposé on 10b5-1 
plan misuse that interest in increased regulation was reignited.  Within 
weeks of the article’s publication, a consortium of pension funds called 
Council of Institutional Investors (CII) submitted a letter to the SEC 
Chairwoman requesting the agency heighten its regulation of the plans.199  
The letter suggests, among other things, that: 
• The plans only be adoptable within a pre-specified window, 
• the insider be prohibited from having multiple 10b5-1 plans 
with possibly overlapping provisions, 
• the first trade under a 10b5-1 plan be preferably three months 
after adoption of the plan, and 
• the insider be prohibited from frequently modifying or 
cancelling the plan.200 
Additionally, the letter stated that the CII advocates pre-announced 
disclosure of 10b5-1 plans and immediate disclosure of plan amendments 
and plan transactions, and it recommended that the employer’s board of 
 
Correction, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8400A, 83 SEC Docket 1427 (Aug. 4, 2004). 
 197.  See Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enforcement, 
Opening Remarks Before the 15th Annual National Association of Stock Plan Professionals 
(NASPP) Conference (Oct. 10, 2007), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch101007lct.htm#9 [hereinafter Thomsen Speech]  
(citing research conducted by Jagolinzer).  For more information on Jagolinzer and other 
scholars’ studies of how executives manipulate Rule 10b5-1 plans, see supra notes 137-150 
and accompanying text. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel of the Council of Institutional Investors, 
to the Hon. Elisse B. Walter, Chairman of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2013/petn4-658.pdf. 
 200.  Id. at 3. 
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directors adopt policies covering 10b5-1 plan practices, monitor plan 
transactions, and ensure that such company policies discuss plan use in the 
context of equity hedging and ownership.201 
SEC Chairwoman Elisse B. Walter declined to comment on the CII 
letter at the time,202 but the Commission did express its intention to improve 
enforcement, if not regulation.  Its own response to the Wall Street Journal 
article consisted of opening a probe into trading activity by VeriFone 
Systems CEO Douglas Bergeron and Big Lots CEO Steve Fishman, both of 
whom were cited in the original Journal article.203  Soon thereafter, it was 
reported that the SEC had widened its probe to include executives from a 
broad array of companies.204 
C. The Legal Community Advises Clients to Increase Transparency 
In the wake of the Wall Street Journal article and increased 
enforcement activity from the SEC, legal advisors have counseled clients to 
err on the side of providing more transparency in plan dealings.205  In client 
update blogs and newsletters, many have encouraged corporations to adopt 
a form of “best practices” for plan creation and maintenance that generally 
includes: 
 
 201.  Id. at 1. 
 202.  Michael Siconolfi, Pension Funds Seek Insider Curbs; In Letter to SEC Chairman, 
Group Expresses Concern that Executives Benefit from Improper Trader, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
30, 2012, 8:01 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323635504578211781992442110. 
 203.  Susan Pulliam, Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Insider-Trading Probe Widens; U.S. 
Launches Criminal Investigation Into Stock Sales by Company Executives, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 10, 2012, 8:33 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323339704578171703191880378.  
 204.  See Susan Pulliam, SEC Expands Probe on Executives Trades, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 
2013, at C3 (stating that the SEC was expanding its investigation to companies other than 
previously mentioned/investigated). 
 205.  See, e.g., Yelena M. Barychev, Francis E. Dehel, Melissa Palat Murawsky & 
Michael E. Plunkett, Current Developments in Securities Laws:  10b5-1 Plans Making 
Headlines, BLANK ROME LLP 2 (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/UpToDate-Dec12-Jan13-No9.pdf (suggesting that 
companies publically disclose adoptions, terminations, or amendments of 10b5-1 plans); 
Steve Bochner & Nicki Locker, WSGR Insight & Analysis:  Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans:  
Considerations in Light of Increased Scrutiny, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 2 
(March 2013), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/rule-10b5-1-trading-plans-
consideration-76433/ (encouraging companies to publically disclose 10b5-1 plans on Form 
4 and Form 144 filings); Publications:  The Spotlight Shines on Rule 10b5-1 Plans:  What 
Public Companies Should Consider Now, GIBSON DUNN 3 (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Spotlight-Shines-Rule10b5-1Plans-What-
PublicCompanies-ShouldConsider.aspx (suggesting companies publically disclose 10b5-1 
plans in advance or at the time they are established). 
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• Delay:  Requiring at least a modest delay between plan 
adoption and commencement of trading under the plan. 
• Disclosure:  Providing for voluntary public disclosure of the 
plan either prior to concurrently with its creation. 
• Dollar Limits:  Imposing transaction limits (either absolute 
dollar or volume limits or proportional to the executives’ 
holdings) within a pre-specified time period. 
Other legal advisors have gone beyond providing advice and are 
taking additional measures such as hosting webinars on best practices and 
risk management with regard to the plans.206 
D. Other Suggestions for Reformation of 10b5-1 Plans 
As awareness of 10b5-1 plan abuse grows, an increasing number of 
voices will undoubtedly add to the discussion on reformation of the plans.  
Future SEC action with regard to the plans will likely look similar to 
proposals put forth by the CII and law firm advice to clients; it may also 
incorporate elements of the following suggestions. 
 
ABOLISH THE PLANS ALTOGETHER:  Cohen et al. suggested that the 
existence of 10b5-1 plans as an affirmative defense did nothing to 
discourage opportunistic trading,207 while Henderson found that executives 
may be manipulating the plans with the primary goal of decreasing 
litigation, though plan participants continue to generate abnormal returns.208  
The implication of the academic literature, therefore, is that perhaps the 
SEC should abolish the 10b5-1 plan defense altogether.  The Commission 
would avoid the administrative costs associated with investigating whether 
a plan was properly implemented and insiders would be deprived of a 
litigation shield protecting opportunistic trades.  To mitigate the harshness 
of such a move, the Commission might reconsider its approach in the 
possession-versus-use debate and whether the Eleventh Circuit’s approach 
in Adler209 might be better suited to evaluating insider trading. 
 
REQUIRE ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE:  Rather than abolishing the 10b5-1 
 
 206.  See WSGR Alert:  The Latest on Insider Trading:  Directors and Executives Face 
Heightened Scrutiny Associated with Stock Trades Even under Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans, 
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://www.wsgr.com/wsgr/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-
rule-10b5-1.htm#1 (scheduling a webinar focused on managing risks associated with Rule 
10b5-1 plans). 
 207.  Cohen et al., supra notes 147-150, and accompanying text. 
 208.  Henderson et al., supra notes 142-146, and accompanying text. 
 209.  137 F.3d 1325, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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affirmative defense, the Commission instead may revisit its 2002 proposal 
to require additional disclosure of plan creation, termination, and 
modification on the Form 8-K.  This move would be in line with both 
Miller’s comments in favor of enhanced disclosure210 and the more recent 
suggestions from the CII, whose members have already endorsed 
heightened disclosure through commitment to corporate governance best 
practices.211  The benefit of additional disclosure would need to be 
considered in light of the accompanying harm of front running and 
potential confusion, however. 
 
REQUIRE DELAY BETWEEN PLAN IMPLEMENTATION AND TRADING:  A 
required “vesting” period after plan implementation would mitigate 
opportunistic sales in advance of negative earnings announcements or the 
release of other unfavorable news.  Jagolinzer found in his 2009 study that 
plan initiation was associated with forthcoming adverse news events; in 
other words, insiders avoid losses by putting plans in place when they 
know bad news is imminent.212  The data showed that the average time 
between plan creation and significantly negative news events was 72.2 
days.213  By widening that delay to, for example, 90 days and making the 
period mandatory, the Commission could close one of the most significant 
loopholes in the plan.  The CII, in its letter to the SEC, specifically 
requested a lag of three months or more.214 
 
PREVENT FREQUENT PLAN MODIFICATION AND CANCELLATION:  An 
enforcement mechanism to preclude insiders from frequently modifying a 
plan would address concerns that executives can change plans after coming 
into possession of insider information.  Specifically, such a rule would 
prevent insiders from adjusting a plan’s “buy” volume up to take advantage 
of positive news, or the “sell” volume downward to avoid losses.  An 
effective rule would also speak to concerns that executives cancel plans in 
order to take advantage of positive forthcoming news, as Jagolinzer found 
was occurring.215 
The CII suggests that the SEC put a stop to these specific loopholes, 
but declines to propose a prevention or enforcement method.216  Elsewhere 
in its request for rulemaking letter to the SEC, however, the group does 
 
 210.  Letter from William H. Miller, III, supra note 195. 
 211.  See Letter from Jeff Mahoney, supra note 200, at 1 (showing concern of CII 
members with respect to potential misuse of trading plans). 
 212.  Jagolinzer, supra note 138, at 17. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Letter from Jeff Mahoney, supra note 199, at 3. 
 215.  Jagolinzer, supra note 139, at 224. 
 216.  Letter from Jeff Mahoney, supra note 199, at 3. 
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recommend that the SEC only allow plan adoption during the company-
specified trading window, which typically coincides with the 
announcement of quarterly earnings.217  This proposal could be expanded to 
require plan modifications and cancellations to be undertaken within the 
same window, thereby preventing opportunistic plan changes. 
CONCLUSION 
“Direct evidence of insider trading is rare,” representatives of the SEC 
Division of Enforcement said in a 1998 speech.218  “There are no smoking 
guns or physical evidence that can be scientifically linked to a perpetrator.  
Unless the insider trader confesses his knowledge in some admissible form, 
evidence is almost entirely circumstantial.”219  Unfortunately, that 
circumstantial evidence is all the more obscured by the use of 10b5-1 plans. 
Various groups have voiced concerns about the affirmative defense 
from the beginning, but renewed focus on possible reformation of the plans 
arose after the Wall Street Journal published an exposé in November 2012, 
highlighting several instances of particularly suspicious trading activity 
taking place under 10b5-1 plans.220  The Journal’s article appears to 
corroborate both academic literature on the subject and case law.  The SEC, 
for its part, appears to be approaching reform from an enforcement 
perspective, while other groups are pushing for regulatory change.  While it 
is as yet unclear whether 10b5-1 plans will survive an impending 
regulatory shift, it is more apparent that some adjusting is necessary to 




 217.  Id.  In its letter, the CII requested the SEC to adopt guidelines or to amend Rule 
10b5-1 to require plan participants to follow protocols, including that, “Companies and 
company insiders should only be permitted to adopt Rule 10b5-1 trading plans when they 
are permitted to buy or sell securities during company-adopted trading windows . . . .” Id. 
 218.  Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir. of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Div. of 
Enforcement & Melissa A. Robertson, Senior Counsel of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Div. 
of Enforcement, Remarks Before the 16th International Symposium on Economic Crime 11 
(Sept. 19, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm.  
 219.  Id. 
 220.  See Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. 
